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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs . 
RUSSELL EDWARD Y ALOWSKI, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Case No. 201 50270-CA 
As required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24( c ), this reply brief is "limited 
to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." The brief does not restate 
arguments from the opening brief or address matters that do not merit reply. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TffiS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
PRECLUDED YALOWSKI FROM CROSS-EXAMINING THE STATE'S 
COMPLAINING WITNESS REGARDING PRIOR ACTS OF DISHONESTY 
THAT WERE PROBATIVE OF THE WITNESS'S CHARACTER FOR 
UNTRUTHFULNESS AND MOTIVE TO TESTIFY FALSELY. 
The State concedes in its brief that the issue is preserved as to rules 608(b) and 
403. This Court should reverse because (A) Yalowski established prejudice, and (B) the 
trial court abused its discretion by precluding cross-examination regarding prior 
misconduct that was admissible and highly probative of Richards's credibility . 
A. Yalowski Established Prejudice. 
Contrary to the State's claims, the trial court's exclusion of Richards's plea in 
abeyance (theft by deception) and 2014 arrest (giving a false name to an officer and theft 
by deception) was not harmless. See Aple. Br. 22-25. Richards's testimony was critical to 
the State's case, particularly with respect to the burglary and threat of violence 
allegations. Moreover, the extent of the cross-examination allowed was insufficient to 
expose Richards's motive to lie and reveal her incapacity for truthfulness. 
First, the State contends that its "case neither rose nor fell on [Richards's] 
credibility." Aple. Br. 22. The State is mistaken as it is reasonably likely that Richards's 
testimony significantly influenced the jury's decision. For example, Richards's testimony 
was important with respect to the elements of burglary and threat of violence. 
Burglary requires more than just "enter[ing] the [victim's] home without 
permission." Aple. Br. 23. Rather, "it is 'the intent to commit' [a] specific underlying 
offense which qualifies the crime as burglary" as opposed to criminal trespass. State v. 
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, if32 n.56, 279 P.3d 371; see also Utah Code§ 76-6-202. Thus, to 
establish the elements of burglary in this case, the State had to prove that Y alowski 
intended to commit assault, which is defined, inter alia, as "a threat, accompanied by a 
show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another." Utah Code §76-5-
102 (2003); see also R.90, 95. 1 
1 As explained in the opening brief, the jury's consideration of the crimes 
Yalowski "intended to commit" was limited to assault or lewdness. R.90. The jury 
acquitted on the lewdness count, so it is likely they convicted under an assault theory. 










As Richards provided the only evidence of Yalowski's alleged threats of bodily 
injury, her testimony was critical to satisfy burglary's requisite intent-that is, the intent 
to threaten Richards with bodily injury while entering or remaining in her home. See 
Utah Code§ 76-6-202. Her testimony was also essential to convict Yalowski of threat of 
violence, which requires proof of a "threat[] to commit any offense involving bodily 
injury [or] death." Utah Code§ 76-5-107 (1). 
Tabora's testimony added little value to the overall evidence, as she could not 
recall the conversation between Richards and Yalowski. She only described "arguing" 
and "bickering." R.167: 140-41, 150. But evidence of arguing does not establish that 
Yalowski threatened Richards with bodily injury. Nor does evidence of Tabora and 
Richards acting "frightened" establish what Yalowski said. See Aple. Br. 23. 
Accordingly, without Richards's testimony, the State could not prove that any threats 
were made; all they could show was an argument between Richards and Y alowski. Thus, 
Richards's testimony was critical to satisfy burglary's intent element as well as the 
elements of threat of violence. In other words, Richards's credibility mattered. 
The State also maintains that the error was harmless because Y alowski "was 
allowed to ask [Richards] about using a false name." Aple. Br. 24. But cross-examination 
regarding Richards' s use of a false identification was insufficient to expose Richards' s 
motive to lie and reveal her incapacity for truthfulness. As discussed, the defense's ability 
to fully develop that cross-examination was circumscribed by the fact that Richards used 
that this count was "supported solely by [Richards's] uncorroborated testimony." Aple. 
Br. 24. 
3 
the fake ID to visit Yalowski at the jail. See Aplt. Br. 25-26; see also R.167:11-15, 131. 
Accordingly, defense counsel had to limit her cross-examination of Richards to questions 
that would not reveal Y alowski was incarcerated. 
Moreover, Richards' s use of a false ID-viewed in isolation-did not serve to 
undermine her veracity in the same way it would if the sum of her dishonest acts were 
revealed to the jury. See United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 717-19, (4th Cir. 1981) 
(finding limitation of the defendant's cross-examination of a prosecution witness "was 
clearly prejudicial error" where the sum of the witness' dishonest acts "establish[ ed] a 
pattern of fraudulent activity that, if revealed, would have placed [the witness's] 
credibility in question"). Nor did it shed light on Richards' s pattern of misconduct and 
deceit, which demonstrated her willingness to lie in order to satisfy her self-interests. 
Thus, by disallowing cross-examination on the plea in abeyance and 2014 arrest, the jury 
was denied full exposure to Richard's character for untruthfulness and motive to testify 
falsely. 
B. The Trial Court Erred By Limiting Yalowski's Cross-examination Of 
Richards Regarding Her Prior Plea In Abeyance And 2014 Arrest; This 
Misconduct Was Highly Probative Of Richards's Credibility And Admissible 
Under Rules 608 And 403. 
Richards's prior acts of misconduct were probative of her character for 
truthfulness under rule 608(b) and her motive to testify falsely under rule 608(c); that 
probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under rule 403. 
l. Rules 608(b) & 608(c). 









name to a police officer were relevant to Richards's "general character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness" under rule 608(b). Aple. Br. 27. Contrary to the State's claims, 
Richards's prior acts of misconduct were also probative of her motive to testify falsely 
under rule 608( c ). Moreover, defense counsel preserved an argument under rule 608( c ), 
and Yalowski can demonstrate plain error. See Aple. Br. 30-33. 
First, the State takes an unnecessarily narrow view of what constitutes "motive," 
which is defined broadly as "something (as a need or desire) that causes a person to act." 
See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/motive; State v. Morris, 40 Utah 431, 
122 P. 380, 382 (1912) (defining motive as "the moving power which impels to action for 
a definite result"); see also Utah R. Evid. 608 (c) (broadly allowing evidence of "[b]ias, 
prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent" (emphasis added)). As the State itself 
recognizes, Richards' s misconduct demonstrates a "willingness to lie for personal gain." 
Aple. Br. 32. Her acts do not only show that she lied in the past, but also shed light on 
why she lies-to satisfy her own self-interests. Accordingly, her acts are probative of why 
she would lie about Yalowski's conduct on the night of the incident-again, to satisfy her 
own self-interests, be it ill-will, pleasure, or revenge. 2 
2 The State also suggests that because Richards already testified favorably for the 
prosecution at preliminary hearing, her 2014 arrest did not give her any incentive to favor 
the prosecution in her testimony. Aple. Br. 32. Regardless of how she testified at the 
preliminary hearing, the lingering prospect of charges gave Richards a personal interest 
in the case, which, if put before the jury, supported a reasonable inference of bias. See 
State v. Fung, 907 P.2d 1192, 1195 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
5 
Next, the State contends that Yalowski did not preserve his argument under Rule 
608(c). Aple. Br. 30-32. However, as discussed, defense counsel gave the court an 
opportunity to rule on Yalowski's rule 608(c) argument when she moved to admit 
Richards's plea in abeyance and 2014 arrest under rule 608. Aplt. Br. 27-28. Defense 
counsel also argued that Richards' s acts "involve[ d] acts of deception with the intent to 
gain something" R.167:10-11 (emphasis added). Counsel's "intent to gain something" 
language was relevant to why Richards lies, i.e. her motive. Thus, counsel adequately 
raised the issue '" even if indirectly,"' by bringing it '"to a level of consciousness such 
that the trial judge [could] consider it."' In re Baby Girl T, 2012 UT 78, if39. 
But even ifYalowski's rule 608(c) argument is unpreserved, Yalowski sufficiently 
demonstrated plain error. Aplt. Br. 27-28. The State nevertheless contends that Yalowski 
"nominally argue[ d]" plain error and that his 608( c) argument should be disregarded 
because he "d[id] not even bother to separate his rule 608(b) and 608(c) arguments." 
Aple. Br. 30-32; State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ififl8-19, 345 P.3d 1226. On the contrary, 
Yalowski demonstrated error by citing to the section of his brief that analyzed-under 
separate headings-why the court erroneously excluded Richards's misconduct under 
rules 608(b), 608(c), and 403. See Aplt. Br. 12-21, 28. In his rule 608(c) section, 
Yalowski conducted a separate legal analysis under rule 608( c) and cited pertinent rules 
and cases. See Aplt. Br. 17-18. He also satisfied plain error's prejudice prong by pointing 
to the section in his brief that analyzed prejudice. See Aplt. Br. 21-28. Finally, Yalowski 













see Aplt. Br. 28, including cases defining the proper scope of a trial court's discretion. 
See State v. Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62, i/i/29-30, 36, 273 P.3d 417. 3 
2. Rule 403 
Even though the trial court did not provide any reasons for limiting Richards's 
cross-examination, the State argues that "the trial court was well within its discretion" to 
disallow inquiry into Richards's misconduct under rule 403. Aple. Br. 25-23. Nothing in 
the record justifies the court's limitations because (1) this case is distinguishable from 
State v. Gomez and State v. Valdez, (2) Richards's misconduct was similar to and 
probative of the circumstances in this case, and (3) the probative value of the misconduct 
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Aple. Br. 25-23. 
First, the State attempts to compare this case to State v. Gomez, which held that the 
trial court was within its discretion to preclude inquiry into the victim's use of a false 
identification card to gain entry into bars. 2002 UT 120, i/7, 33-36, 63 P.3d 72; Aple. Br. 
28-29. Gomez is inapposite because it addressed an isolated instance of untruthful 
conduct that was tangential to whether the victim would lie to the police about the rape 
charges. See id. In this case, however, the strong probative force of Richards's 
misconduct came from her consistent pattern of intentionally deceiving others, including 
law enforcement. 
3 The State contends that the court's error under rule 608( c) was not obvious 
because "[n]othing in Defendant's proffer ... suggest[ed] any connection between 
Defendant and [Richards's] accusations in this case," Aple. Br. 32. Yalowski's trial 
counsel, however, argued that Richards's misconduct "involve[d] acts of deception with 
the intent to gain something" R.167: 10-11 (emphasis). This language was relevant to why 
Richards lies, i.e. her "motive" to falsely incriminate Yalowski. See Utah R. Evid. 608( c ). 
7 
This case is also distinguishable from State v. Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, 141 P.3d 
614; Aple. Br. 29-30. In that case the trial court permitted cross-examination concerning 
the victim's forgery conviction, but precluded inquiry into a dismissed false information 
to police charge. Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, if4. This court affirmed, reasoning that the 
probative value of the dismissed charge was "negligible in light of other similar 
impeachment evidence and because a dismissed charge [wa]s merely an allegation of 
misconduct. "Id. ,r16. 
In this case, Richards's dishonest acts included recent acts that were strongly 
probative of a continuous pattern of lying. Unlike Valdez, where there was no indication 
that the victim's giving of false information occurred temporally close to trial, at least 
one ofRichards's acts of misconduct took place in June, 2014-only 6 months before 
trial. R.71-75, 167: 10-11. Also, Richards's acts of misconduct collectively reveal a 
stronger pattern of deceit as there were three separate instances in total. R.167 :9-11. 
Accordingly, the sum of Richards' s misconduct demonstrates a continuous course of lies 
that persisted up until the trial, which was highly probative of her willingness to lie on the 
stand. 
Secondly, the State argues that the misconduct was only "marginally" probative of 
"whether she was telling the truth here." Aple. Br. 27. To support this argument, the State 
contends that "the defense proffer about the plea in abeyance and the arrest was too 
vague to say whether they involved specific instances of conduct similar to the 
circumstances here." Aple. Br. 27-28. On the contrary, the defense proffered that 













[ and] acts of deception with the intent to gain something." R.167: 10-11. Counsel's 
proffer adequately informed the court that Richards's conduct was probative of: (1) 
whether Richards lied to the police in this case and (2) her willingness to lie for purposes 
of self-gain. 
The record also refutes the State's claim that "the trial court could have reasonably 
viewed [the 2014 arrest] as a mere allegation of misconduct." Aple. Br. 28. In fact, it is 
evident that the trial court was not concerned that the arrest constituted a "mere 
allegation" because it allowed inquiry into Richards's use of a false ID at the jail, which 
was also an allegation of misconduct. 
Nor was it important that Yalowski "never proffered when the dismissed plea in 
abeyance was." Aple. Br. 28. Nothing in the record suggests that the plea in abeyance 
was remote. However, the plea is relevant even if it was remote. Indeed, even remote 
misconduct carries strong probative value if the person "has not led a legally blameless 
life since the time of the remote prior" and it fits into a "'pattern"' of misconduct. People 
v. Mendoza, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 220 (Cal.App. 4th 2000). The record reveals that 
Richards did not lead a "blameless life" given her recent June 2014 arrest and her use of a 
fake ID at the jail while Yalowski' s charges were pending. Thus, regardless of the age of 
the plea in abeyance, the act carried strong probative value as it fit into an uninterrupted 
pattern of lying for self-gain. 
Finally, the State is wrong to suggest that evidence of Richards's plea in abeyance 
and 2014 arrest was "unlikely to have any effect other than to embarrass [Richards] and 
to distract the jury." Aple. Br. 28. As explained, Richards's prior acts of misconduct were 
9 
highly probative of her character for truthfulness and motive to testify falsely. Moreover, 
Defense counsel asked that she be allowed to "briefly cross-examine [Richards]" 
regarding the instances and proffered that her inquiry would involve "approximately 
three questions" for each incident. R.167: 11; Aplt. Br. 21. Counsel's proffer suggested 
that she did not plan to inquire into irrelevant detail at the risk of the jury's confusion or 
Richard's embarrassment. Thus, on balance, the risk of prejudice, if any, did not 
substantially outweigh the strong probative value of the evidence. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ADMITTING 
LAY OPINION TESTIMONY REGARDING SHOE IMPRESSION EVIDENCE 
THAT REQUIRED SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE AND WAS NOT HELPFUL 
TO THE JURY. 
A. Kalinowski Offered Opinions About The Shoe Impressions That Fausett 
Never Gave. 
Kalinowski, a lay forensic technician, offered opinions regarding shoe impression 
evidence that were unfounded and misleading and required a degree of knowledge well 
outside the ken of the average bystander. Even though Kalinowski provided inappropriate 
lay opinions that Officer Fausett never gave, the State argues that Yalowski's failure to 
challenge Fausett's testimony was "fatal to his claim." Aple. Br. 38-40. The State is 
incorrect. 
To be clear, Yalowski challenged Kalinowki's testimony because it went above 
and beyond Fausett's testimony and exceeded what State v. Ellis held was appropriate. 
748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1987). Fausett's testimony was more akin to the lay opinion 
testimony in Ellis; it involved general comparisons about observed similarities between 








Fausett's testimony in two ways: (1) by testifying that an impression in the snow was 
"identical" to tread pattern areas of Y alowski' s sneakers, see R.167 :208, and (2) by 
drawing the following conclusions: 
[although] there's not much of a shoe impression on the top, ... you can 
see ... down the side [ of the door] you have that same, similar, block cut 
pattern on the side of the shoe indicating more of an angled hit towards 
the door. Therefore, you wouldn't see much of the shoe itself, but more of 
the side of the shoe. 
R.167:209-10; see also R.167:207; State's Exh. 45. 
Kalinowski asserted his conclusion-using an expression of absolute certainty-
that the tread patterns were "[i]dentical." R.167:208. He also told the jury that the mark 
on Richards's door was a shoe impression and that the impression was created by 
"hit[ting]" the door at an angle. R.167:209-10. Fausett offered no conclusions of this 
strength. Cf R.167: 180 (Fausett describing "white marks [ on the door] that are similar to 
the ones in size and shape that we saw on the shoe print impressions"); see generally 
R.167:166-83, 189-90. And unlike Fausett's testimony, Kalinowski's opinions went to 
the ultimate issue of breaking and entering. That is, whether Yalowski unlawfully entered 
Richards's home by forcefully kicking her door with his shoe. Thus, Kalinowski's 
testimony was not cumulative of Fausett's. 
B. Kalinowski's Lay Opinion Testimony Required Specialized Knowledge And 
Failed To Assist The Jury. 
Kalinowski's testimony was not "the same as that given in Ellis." Aple. Br. 40-47. 
Additionally, his opinions were not helpful and could not be "'readily drawn by any 
person who observed both' the shoes and the shoe impressions." Aple. Br. 42-48. 
11 
First, the State argues that Kalinowski's testimony was "no different from the 
muddy footprint comparison in Ellis." Aple. Br. 42. But as explained, the lay security 
guard in Ellis merely "compared the footprints outside the house to those inside." Ellis, 
748 P.2d at 190. He also said that one exhibit, "a photograph of a footprint 'with the 
distinctive heel marking[,] appeared to be the one on the inside of the carpet."' Id. 
However, unlike Kalinowski, the lay security guard in Ellis did not use terms of certainty 
like "identical;" he did not claim that impressions were "identical" to tread patterns on 
the defendant's shoe; he did not conclude that an otherwise ambiguous mark was a shoe 
impression; and he did not off er his opinion concerning the type of force needed to create 
such an impression. See id. at 190-91. Thus, in contrast to Ellis, Kalinowski did not 
merely "compare[]" the footprints and suggest that they "'appeared to be"' similar. Id. 
Additionally, the State argues that Kalinowski's testimony was helpful, and his 
conclusion that the tread patterns were "identical" "did not tell the jury what result what 
to reach." Aple. Br. 43-44. It reasons, inter alia, that "it is not as all clear that the 
technician's isolated 'identical' meant 'matched."' Aple. Br. 43-44. 4 It further contends 
that this conclusion required no specialized knowledge because Kalinowki only pointed 
out readily observable similarities using terms like "'similar' and 'consistent with,"' but 
never "certain match." Aple. 47-48. The State fails to appreciate that words matter-
particular in the context of forensic evidence. 
Powerful words like "'identical"' and "'match"' have a "profound effect on how 
4 
"Identical" is defined as "exactly the same," see http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/identical, and "match" is similarly defined as "an exact 









the trier of fact ... perceives and evaluates scientific evidence." National Research 
Council of the National Academies, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: 
A Path Forward, 21 (2009) [NAS Report]. Studies show that jurors overestimate the 
meaning of these terms. See Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, 
Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and 
Impact, 59 Hastings L.J. 1159, 1188 (2008). Moreover, as is the case with shoe 
impression comparison evidence, terming a comparison a "match" or "identical" may 
imply a degree of confidence that is not scientifically supportable or meaningful. NAS 
Report, at 149; Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude?: The Nas Report on 
Forensic Science and the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 299,313 (2010). 
These considerations have generated concern among researchers 5 and have prompted 
courts to limit expert expressions of certitude with respect to forensic evidence. 6 
If courts are to allow lay witnesses to testify about similarities among shoes and 
shoe impressions, then they should require these witnesses to use terminology 
commensurate with their lay understanding of the evidence. Only then can the testimony 
be helpful to the jury. But as argued, that was not the case here. See Aplt. Br. 31-34. And 
5 See, e.g., John M. Butler, Advanced Topics in Forensic DNA Typing: 
Interpretation 472-74 (2015); NAS Report, at 21; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 
Communicating Opinion Evidence, at 1188. 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp.2d 351, 372-73 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(refusing to allow the expert to "assert any degree of statistical certainty, 100 percent or 
otherwise, as to a match" where "there [ wa]s no reliable statistical or scientific 
methodology which w[ould] currently permit the expert to" give such testimony); United 
States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Taylor, 
663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179-80 (D. N.M. 2009). 
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furthermore, if researchers and courts agree that opinions of certitude exceed the scope of 
proper expert testimony, then surely Kalinowski's conclusion that the tread patterns were 
"identical" required specialized knowledge outside the ken of an average bystander. 
The State likewise argues that Kalinowski 's opinions regarding the mark on the 
door were helpful and did not require specialized knowledge. Aple. Br. 47-48. It claims 
that Kalinowski's "inference" "that the shoe struck the door at an angle was proper under 
rule 701" because it could "be readily drawn by any person who observed both" the shoes 
and the photos. Aple. Br. 45, 48. These arguments are unpersuasive. 
Yalowski urges this Court to look at the photos of the marks on the door. See 
Addendum A; State's Exs. 12, 43-45. The photo portrays several small, indistinct marks. 
These marks could have come from many different sources. Could they be rub marks left 
from moving an oversized piece of furniture through the door? Or could they be paint 
marks? Based on these pictures and without better context, it is not readily inferable that 
a shoe was the source of the marks. Kalinowski, however, implied to the jury that these 
marks came from "the side of the shoe"; the reason the full impression was not visible 
was the person's "angled hit to the door." R.167:209-10. 
But even if the source of the marks was a shoe, it was not readily inferable that 
they were produced by an "angled hit to the door." R.167 :209-10. A juror just as easily 
could have concluded that the marks came from an individual, such as Yalowski, who 
used his foot to push open the door because his hands were full. Kalinowski' s comments 
concerning the marks on the door were not appropriate inferences for a lay witness to 









whether the marks came from a "hit to the door" was an inference for the jury to make. 
Or alternatively, this was an opinion that should have been drawn by a properly qualified 
expert. As given, Kalinowski's opinions were unhelpful and required the specialized 
knowledge of an expert. 
Finally, the State contends "the jury knew that no one expected them to 
unquestionably accept [Kalinowski's] comparisons, no matter how strong his opinions." 
Aple. Br. 46. "And because the testimony did not purport to draw a conclusion based on 
scientific methodology, the jury would not likely feel compelled to give [Kalinowski's] 
lay comparisons any greater weight than its own lay comparison." Aple. Br. 49. But even 
if Kalinowski did not claim to draw his conclusions from scientific principles, "we cannot 
underestimate the weight that juries give to forensic evidence." Gardner v. U.S., 999 
A.2d 55, 63 (D.C. 2010). Even the testimony of a "forensic technician," like Kalinowski, 
is likely to "overawe"-particularly where he testified to details that were not readily 
apparent from the photos and shoes. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 2002 UT 
115, ,I56, 61 P.3d 1068. Moreover, Kalinowski's use of terms of certainty as well as the 
conclusory tone in which he delivered his opinions likely contributed to the weight the 
jury afforded Kalinowki's testimony. R.167:209-10 ("Therefore, you wouldn't see much 
of the shoe itself, but more of the side of the shoe." (emphasis added)). Thus, it is 
reasonable to believe that the jury would defer to Kalinowski' s opinions. 
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III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
IMPROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENSE'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER 
RICHARDS TESTIFIED ABOUT YALOWSKI'S PRIOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE 
IN VIOLATION OF RULE 404(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Even though Richards testified about Yalowski "getting violent" in violation of a 
pretrial agreement and rule 404(b ), the State maintains that the trial court properly denied 
Yalowski's mistrial motion. Aple. Br. 49-56. To support its argument, the State contends 
that the comment "likely escaped the jury." Aple. Br. 55. This claim is unpersuasive. 
Richards's reference to Yalowski "getting violent" was not tangential to the issues 
in the case. Instead, her comment went to the heart of Richards' s and Y alowski' s 
relationship. It also implicated conduct that was directly related to the charges, which 
included threat of violence and burglary with the intent to assault. See Utah Code§ 76-5-
102 (2003); § 76-6-202 (2003); §76-5-107(1); R.1-5; see also State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 
70, ,r36, 321 P.3d 1136 ("prosecutor's comments were highly prejudicial since they went 
to the heart of what the jury was being asked to decide"). 
With knowledge that Yalowski had acted violently against Richards in the past, 
the jury could have believed that Yalowski 's behavior had not changed; thus, they could 
have concluded that Yalowski violently threatened Richards in this case. See State v. 
Reed, 2000 UT 68, ,r23, 8 P.3d 1025 ("It is of course fundamental in our law that a 
person can be convicted only for acts committed, and not because of general character or 
a proclivity to commit bad acts."). And given the court's limitations on Yalowski's 
ability to attack Richards's credibility, it is likely that the jury placed undue weight on 




















would have enjoyed a more favorable result if the jury did not hear Richards's "getting 
violent" comment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above and in the opening brief, Yalowski asks this Court to 
reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED thi~tay of March, 2016 . 
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